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This paper examines provisions ofthe FDIC Improvement
Act related to corporate governance of banks. These
provisionsfocus on the composition and independence of
the auditcommittee andon increasedregulatory influence
over executive compensation. The composition ofaudit
committees for a sample of banking firms for 1990 is
compared with those of industrial firms and with the
provisions ofFDICIA. The findings suggest only minor
differences between banks andotherfirms; however, under
FDICIA provisions, large changes in the composition of
bank audit committees are likely. Provisions related to
compensation have focused on CEOs. To address this
issue, I compare the 1990 levels and factors explaining
differences in CEO compensation for a sample ofbanks
andindustrialfirms. Thefindings suggestthat bank CEOs
earn slightly less than their industrial counterparts and
that cross-sectional differences in CEO compensation in
banking and other industries are explained by similar
factors.
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Most aspects of corporate governance have traditionally
been beyond the scope of corporate law and bank regula-
tion. Recent problems in the savings and loan industry are
credited with motivating the FDIC Improvement Act of
1991 (hereafter FDICIA) provisions related to the role
ofboards of directors in governing banks. Specific provi-
sions are designed to strengthen the audit function of the
board and to have regulators develop guidelines for com-
pensating directors and officers. Both provisions can be
viewed as increasedregulatory influence on the previously
largelyunregulatedareaofcorporategovernanceinbanks.1
This article explores the provisions of FDICIA that
directly affect the board of directors' role in corporate
governance.2 Afterreviewing theissues ofdebaterelatedto
compensation for boards ofdirectors and CEOs, I compare
the composition of board audit committees for a sample
ofbanking and nonbanking firms. Additionally, I examine
whetherthe provisions ofFDICIA related to the audit com-
mittee will substantially alter the composition of this
committee.
The provisions related to director and officer compensa-
tion appear to reflectthe currentnational concern thatCEO
pay is excessive. While the answer to this question is
beyondthe scopeofthis paper, the focus hereis to compare
levels of compensation for nonmanagement directors and
CEOs for the sample ofbanks and industrial firms. Addi-
tional analysis of CEO. compensation is undertaken to
determineifcross-sectionaldifferences inCEO compensa-
tionreflectthe samefactors in banks as inindustrialfirms. 3
1. Nationally chartered banks have faced a minimal amount ofregula-
tion related to the size ofthe board and tostockownership by the board
per the Banking Act of 1935 (see Brickley and James 1987 for a
discussion).
2. While one can argue that virtually all ofthe provisions will affect the
board, the focus here is on the impact of provisions related to the
composition of the audit committee and to guidelines for officer and
director compensation.
3. Recent controversy has developed in Japan over bank employee and
officer compensation relative to industrial firms. Some evidence sug-
gests that, on average, Japanese bank executives eam 20 to 30 percent
more than their industrial counterparts.
Economic Review / 1993, Number 1This will allow us to evaluate bank CEO compensation
relative to that ofless regulated firms.
The empirical findings of this paper suggest that the
provisions ofFDICIA related to the composition ofthe au-
dit committee may cause major changes in current prac-
tices. For a sample of large banks I show that the audit
committee is composed ofindependent directors as tradi-
tionally defined. However, as interpreted under FDICIA,
considering outside directors ofbank customers as a bank
customerlikely will exclude currentbankauditcommittee
members. The evidence related to compensation practices
suggests that, on average, CEOs ·of banks earn less than
their industrial counterparts. In analyzing cross-sectional
differences in CEO compensation between banks and
industrial firms the evidence presented suggests similar
factors appear to explain levels of CEO compensation
for banks and for industrial firms. These findings suggest
that banks do not appear to differ significantly from
their industrial counterparts in terms of the role of cor-
porate governance in board audit committees and CEO
compensation.
The remainder ofthe paper is structured as follows: In
SectionI, a briefdescription ofthe debate aboutthe role of
boards of directors in corporate governance is summa-
rized, followed by a brief review of the debate over
executive compensation. Section II describes the provi-
sions of FDICIA related to the independence of the audit
committee and executive compensation. Section III pre-
sents the empirical analysis of the composition of audit
committees of banks, followed by the analysis of CEO
compensation for sample bank and industrial firms. The
article concludes with a discussion of the policy implica-
tions ofthese findings.
I. BOARD OF DIRECTORS, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, AND CEO COMPENSATION
BoardofDirectors and Corporate Governance
Corporate governance has traditionally been beyond the
scope ofcorporate law and bank regulations. Regulations
related to transactions between directors and banks are
specific, but it is unlikely that these materially affect the
composition ofbank boards ofdirectors.
The last decade has seen numerous proposals for re-
forms in director selection and board composition.4 The
traditionalrole attributedto corporateboards ofdirectorsis
to resolve conflicts ofinterest among decisionmakers and
residual risk-bearers. Their power arises from their ability
to hire, fire, evaluate, and compensate senior management
4. See Baysinger and Butler(1985) for a discussion ofthese proposals.
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teams. Itis frequently arguedthatthe selectionofdirectors
is left almost totally to the discretion of the managers
whose behavior they are supposed to monitor (Dunn 1987,
Mace 1987, Vancil 1987). As a result, reform proposals
focus on greaterboard independence from firm managers.
These have ranged from requiring a majority ofindepend-
ent directors to requiring that no current or pastemployees
beon the board ofdirectors with theexceptionofthe CEO.
Empirical support for the benefits of board independ-
ence is reflected in a numberofstudies thathave examined
market responses to changes in the composition of the
board and other managerial actions. Rosenstein and Wyatt
(1990) document a positive stock price response to the
appointment of an additional outside director but no sig-
nificant price responsetothe appointment ofan additional
inside director. Byrd and Hickman (1991) examine take-
overactivity and find apositiverelationshipbetweenboard
independence of bidding firms and wealth effects associ-
atedwith tenderoffers. Additionally, Lee, etal. (1992) find
that greater board independence is associated with more
positive stock price response for firms undertaking lever-
aged buyouts.
Direct evidence on the monitoring actions of boards is
reported in Weisbach (1988) who finds that as the level
of board independence increases, the likelihood that the
board will replace the CEO after a period ofpoor perform-
ance increases. Brickley and James (1987) examine meas-
ures ofperquisite consumption for a sample ofbanks and
conclude that a greater presence of outside directors re-
duces managerial consumption of perquisites when the
takeover market is limited by the presence ofstate regula-
tion. They note that this may reflect differences in the cost
ofproducing banking services in the presence ofincreased
state bankingregulations. In a morerecent study ofthe life
insurance industry, Mayers, Shivdasani, and Smith (1992)
find evidence that for the companies where the takeover
market is absent (i.e., mutuals) outside directors are used
more extensively to monitor management.
Although virtually all previous studies have addressed
the composition ofthe entire board, many ofthe activities
ofboards ofdirectors are accomplished in smaller groups
or committees. A survey of the Fortune 1000 firms· by
Kesner (1988) showed an average of4.3 committees, with
70 percent ofsample firms maintaining between three and
five committees.
Kesner found that virtually all boards have audit, nomi-
nating, compensation, and executive committees, and that
their most common duties are as follows: The audit com-
mittee sets the scope and reviews audits with the external
auditors; the compensation committee reviews and makes
recommendations on compensation for senior manage-
ment; the nominating committee considers stockholder
15recommendations and selection ofnominees for directors',
the executive committee acts in lieu of the full board if
immediate action is required and counsels the CEO on
ideas and proposals prior to disclosure to the full board.
CEO Compensation Debate
The motivation for incorporating regulatory oversight into
bank compensation appears to reflect congressional reac-
tion to a few widely publicized abuses in the savings and
loan industry and to a growing sentiment that CEOs are
avelpaid. The criticisms ofCEO pay focus on concerns that
the level ofpay in recent years is too high and that cross-
sectional differences do not reflect differences in firm
performance.
The concern about the level of CEO pay is not new.
Brownstein and Panner (1992) note that in 1939 President
Roosevelt railed against the "entrenched greed" of cor-
porate executives. They also note that at that time the
U.S. Treasury published a list ofexecutives earning more
than $15,000 dollars per year and the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) started requiring corpora-
tions to submitdetailed disclosure ofexecutive compensa-
tion to shareholders.
The recent concern over pay has led to the SECdecision
that it will no longer permit corporations to exclude from
their proxy statements nonbinding shareholder proposals
concerning executive and/or director compensation. New
reporting requirements related to non~ash compensation
are also an outcome ofthis round ofconcernoverCEO pay.
Additional pressure is forthcoming from large institu-
tional shareholders andshareholderrights groups thathave
negotiated changes in executive compensation at several
companies.
While FDICIA potentially affects a broad range of
compensation contracts, the primaryfocus is onCEO com-
pensation. Previous studies have focused on economic
explanations for cross-sectional differences in CEO com-
pensation and the degree to which compensation reflects
relative performance. Studies generally find that firm char-
acteristics are able to explain 20 to 30 percent of the
variation in cash compensation (see Jensen and Murphy
1990b for a discussion). However, studies ofthe relation-
ship between performance and compensation are mixed.5
Generally, studies attempting to explain CEO compensa-
tion control for firm size, profitability, job tenure, plus
measures ofownership and control.
5. For a discussion ofthe issues, see Performance andCompensation:
AnIssue ofCorporate Governance pp. 1-102. Conference proceedings
from Northwestern University, January 13, 1992.
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II. PROVISIONS OF FDICIA RELATED
TO BOARD STRUCTURE AND COMPENSATION
While enhanced regulation likely will affect the composi-
tion ofthe entire board, proposals specifically focus on the
compositionoftheaudit committee and on the activities of
the compensation committee. FDICIA introduces two reg-
ulations that potentially affect the structure and actions of
boards ofdirectors in banks. The changes reflect the desire
to protect the soundness of the deposit insurance fund
through increased managerial accountability to the board
of directors and restrictions on employee compensation.
In an effort to improve accountability, the legislation
focuses on the composition and structure of the audit
committeeofthe boardofdirectors. Specifically, underthe
new legislation banks are required to have audit commit-
tees composed ofoutside directors that are independent of
the management of the institution. Additional require-
ments are imposed on "large" institutions: Their audit
committees must be composed of members who are not
large customers of the institution, who have banking or
related financial management expertise, and they must
have access to the committee's own outside counsel. The
magnitude of the changes in the composition of this
committee likely will reflect how precisely regulators
define "large customers" ofthe institution.
The legislation prescribes that the audit committee shall
review the external audit with management and the in-
dependent accountants. These actions are designed to
increase the independence ofthe audit committee, thereby
strengthening its ability to monitor management and cur-
tail its risk-taking behavior.
The impact ofFOlCIAon board compensation commit-
tees is less direct. Theactivities ofthis committeetypically
include reviewing and making recommendations to the
board, and in some cases setting senior management
compensation. The provisions do not specify the composi-
tion of compensation committees, but do provide more
oversight by regulators. The legislation calls for each
appropriatefederal banking agency to prescribeguidelines
for reasonable compensation. Specifically the agencies are
to prohibit as unsafe and unsound any employment con-
tract that could lead to a material financial loss to the
financial institution. Employment contracts are to include
any compensation or benefit agreement, fee arrangement,
perquisite, stock option plan, post-employment benefit, or
other compensatory arrangement that would provide any
executive officer, employee, director, or principal share-
holder of the institution with excessive compensation,.
fees, or benefits. Additionally, the appropriate regulatory
agency is required to specify when compensation, fees, or
benefits are excessive. The factors to beconsideredinclude
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TABLE 1
aIncludes two savings and loans.
bExcludes communications, electricity, water, and gas utilities.
The data in Table 1 indicate that banks use all three
methods ofindirect compensation at least as frequently as
nonbanking firms and have director retirement plans and
deferred compensation plans more frequently than non-
banking firms. Data on the dollar value of each of these
plans are not available, but the frequency of their use
suggests that the benefits to being a bank director are
understated relative to nonbanking firms. However, it
shouldbenotedthatbankdirectors face increasedpotential
liability due to the presence of a maze ofpotentially liti-
gious regulatory authorities.
Bank boards have, a larger percentage of nonmanage-
ment directors (81 percent) than nonbanking boards in
the sample (73 percent). Nonmanagement directors are
divided into those affiliated with andthose independentof
the company. To be classified as affiliated, a director must
hold one of the following relationships with the firm:
member of an insiders' stockholder group (10 percent or
more ofvoting stock); partofan interlocking directorship;
former employee; relatedto anofficer; memberofa profes-
sional firm that provides services to the company; a sig-
nificant supplier/customer relationship; derive personal

























































the combined value of all cash and noncash benefits pro-
vided to the individual, the compensation history of the
individual and other individuals with comparable ex-
pertise at the institution, the financial condition of the
institution, and compensation practices at comparable in-
stitutions, based on such factors as asset size, geographic
location, and complexity of the loan portfolio or other
assets. For post-employmentbenefits regulators must con-
siderthe projected total cost andbenefitto the institutions,
any connection between the individual and any fraudulent
actoromission, breachoftrustorfiduciary duty, orinsider
abuse with regard to the institution, and other factors that
the agency determines to be relevant, and such other
standards relating to compensation, fees, and benefits as
the agency determines to be appropriate. These provisions
potentially restrict much ofthe power ofboardcompensa-
tion committees in determining senior executives' salary
andboardofdirectors' fees. Not surprisingly, this aspectof
FDICIA has been widely criticized within the industry.
6. Two savings and loan holding companies are excluded. Including
these firms does not materially affect the results.
To gauge the potential impactofFDICIA on bankboards I
examine the characteristics of boards for a sample of 22
banks and 367 nonbanking firms included in the S&P 500
in 1990. Public utility firms are excluded as a result ofthe
strict regulatory burden these firms face. Nonbank deposi-
tory institutions are excluded from the banking firm sam-
ple.6 Additional exclusions are due to incomplete data.
Sampledata are based on1990proxy statements compiled
by the Investor Responsibility Research Center.
Summary statistics for sample firms are presented in
Table 1. Banks tend to have larger boards ofdirectors than
nonbanking firms. The directors of banking firms meet
more frequently and are compensated at a slightly higher
level than those ofnonbanking firms. Additional benefits
that may be provided to outside directors ofcorporations
include retirement plans, stock purchase plans and de-
ferred compensation plans. Under a retirement plan, non-
employee directors receive all or part of their annual
retainer fee for a certain period of time after they retire
from the board. In a stock purchase plan, the company
grants nonemployee directors stock or stock options on
a regular basis, in addition to their regular compensa-
tion. Deferred compensation plans generally allow non-
employee directors to defer cash compensation (retainer
andmeeting fees) until afterthey retire from the board, but
only ifthe funds are investedin shares ofcommonstockor
stock equivalents.
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco 1716 percent of banks' outside directors are affiliated and
19 percent of nonbanks' outside directors are affiliated.
These results are consistent with greater board inde-
pendence for banking than for nonbanking firms. In con-
trast, evidence in favor of less independence for bank
boards is that the CEO is also chairman of the board in
89 percent of sample banks compared to 70 percent of
nonbanking firms. Interlockingdirectorships are presentin
55 percent of sample banks versus 20 percent for the
nonbank firms. This difference likely reflects regulation-
induced bank holding company structure under which
mostbanksoperate. Thisstructureencourageslegallysepa-
ratecorporations undera bankholding companyumbrella.
Althoughsampledata are limitedto a asmallsetoflarge
banks, they do suggest differences between the composi-
tion of boards ofbanks and nonbanking firms. The provi-
sions ofFDICIA are intendedto increase the independence
of bank boards in general and the audit committee in
particular. To gaugepotentialconsequences ofthis legisla-
tion on board ofdirector audit committees, I next consider
this committee in greater detail.
TABLE 2
AUDIT COMMITTEE COMPOSITION
NUMBER OF MEMBERS (MEAN)
Independent
Affiliated
AFFILIATED DIRECTORS-FoRM OF AFFILIATION
Interlocking directorships
Fonner employee
Member ofprofessional firm that provides services to the company




CEO or other executive of large company






Investment and commercial bankers and insurers
Other
Evidence on Audit Committee Composition
Table 2 contains summary statistics for the composition of
the audit committees of sample firms. Commercial bank
auditcommittees average six directors as comparedto four
for nonbanking firms. None in the sample report manage-
ment directors on the audit committee. However, on aver-
age both banking and nonbanking firms have one affiliated
outside director on this committee. This indicates that
in percentage terms the audit committees of bank boards
are more independent than those of nonbanking firms.
Whether the composition of these committees meet the
requirements ofFDICIAis unclearsinceitdoes notexclude
affiliated directors from this committee unless they are
judged to have a significant direct supplier/customer re-
lationship. If ultimately directors with indirect relation-
ships are considered to be de facto customers then the
composition ofthis committee will likely changesubstan-
tially. For example, ifoutside directors ofa bank customer
cannot serve on the audit committee of the bank, then
many.current bank directors will be precluded from this
committee.




NUMBER PERCENT NUMBER PERCENT
5 27.8 32 11.5
6 33.3 79 28.4
4 22.2 99 35.6
3 16.7 21 7.5
0 0 15 5.3
0 0 32 11.5
59 42.1 344 23.3
21 15.0 205 13.9
34 24.3 444 30.0
9 6.4 85 5.8
4 2.9 83 5.6
4 2.9 57 3.9
4 2.9 48 3.2
76 5.1
5 3.5 136 9.2
NOTE: ~eca~se data.were availa~le on audit committee composition for more nonbanking finns inthe S&P 500, the size ofthat portion ofthe
sample III thIS table IS 462; the SIze ofthe sample ofbanking finns remains the same.
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. CEO COMPENSATION-SUMMARY STATISTICS
all cash and noncash benefits, compensationhistory ofthe
individual compared to others of comparable expertise,
financial condition of the institution, compensation prac-
tices atcomparable institutions, size, location, complexity
of loan portfolio, and other assets, and total projected
costofpost-employmentbenefits. Mostofthedebateinthe
press has focused on CEO pay. Inthis studyI focus on CEO
and board ofdirector compensation.
Table 3 presents data on CEO compensation for the
sample of bank and industrial firms. CEOs of sample
banks have mean and median salaries of $936,000 and
$740,000 respectively, for 1990. Sample industrial firm
CEOs earnedmean and median salaries of$1,183,000 and
$980,000 respectively, for the same period.
Assessing the value ofnoncash compensation is a diffi-
culttasksubjecttomuchdebate. The mostdifficultcompo-
nent ofcompensation to value are stock option grants. For
the purposes ofthis paperI use the valuationtechnique and
data presented by Crystal (1991). This procedure assumes
the stock price will increase at the normally expected rate

















































MEDIAN SALARY + BONUS
($ thousands)
RANGE OF SALARY + BONUS
($ thousands)
Table 2 presents the form of director affiliation for the
members ofthe audit committees.·For bank audit commit-
tees, most affiliated directors are former employees (33.3
percent); in 27.8 percent of the cases, these directors are
part of an interlocking directorship; the remaining affili-
ateddirectors are eithermembers ofprofessional firms that
provide services to the firm (22.2 percent) or directors
that derive personal benefit from the company (16.7 per-
cent). Nonbanking firms have fewer auditcommitteemem-
bers that are part ofinterlocking boards of directors (11.5
percent) or are former employees (28.4 percent). Firms in
the nonbanking sample more frequently have members of
professional firms providing services to the firm (35.6
percent), significant stockholders (11.5 percent), and rep-
resentatives of organizations that have significant sup-
plier/customer relationships with the firm (5.3 percent).
For sample banks, independent director members of the
audit committee are composed more ofcurrent CEOs and
executives and relatively less of retired business persons
than are nonbanking firms. Ifindependentdirectors having
affiliations withcustomers ofthe bankare consideredto be
customers ofthe bankfor regulatory purposes, as has been
suggested, this is not reflected here.
Under a standardinterpretation ofcustomers these find-
ings suggest that the composition of audit committees of
largebanks inthe samplegenerally satisfies the spiritofthe
related provisions of FDICIA. Under a more strict inter-
pretation through third-party (outside director) affilia-
tions, the analysis here understates the likely impact of
theseprovisions. Whileitis notpossible to draw inferences
regarding smaller banks on this question, the provisions
are most strict for large banks. FDICIA guidelines likely
will lead to greater independence in the composition and
the operations of this committee. It is specified the com-
mittee will have access to its <Lwn outside counsel and thus
may provide a greater degree of direct monitoring of
management by this committee.
Evidence on CEO Compensation
No aspect ofFDICIA has caused as much industry uproar
as the provisions related to officer and director compen-
sation. Under FDICIA the appropriate federal banking
agency must prescribe compensation standards for all
insured depository institutions by August 1, 1993. The
standards are to apply to all forms ofcompensationfor any
executive officer, employee, director or principal share-
holderofthe institution. The standards are to specify when
compensation, fees, or benefits are excessive, unreason-
able, or disproportionate to services performed by the
individual after considering a long list offactors including
Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco 19the future gain. For restricted stock the value is assessed
as the product of the annualized number ofrestricted, or
free, shares granted to the executive and the market price
per share at the time of the grant. Performance grants
includeawards ofboth stock-basedperformanceshares and
performance units paid in cash. While these procedures
likely add some noise to the measureoftotal CEO compen-
sation, the direction of any bias in the true value across
banks versus industrial firms as a result ofthese assump-
tions is unclear. Adding these components of compen-
sation to the salary and bonus provides a measure of
total compensation for the sa.lllple of nonbanking firms
of$2,828,000, while for the sample ofbanking firms the
average is $1,705,000. This indicates that the addition of
noncash compensation further increases the divergence
between the total CEO compensation of nonbanking and
banking firms.
Table 3 also provides statistics on the percentageofeach
group ofsample firms using each type ofnoncash compen-
sation. The sample of banking firms uses more forms of
compensationonaverage. Restricted stock is aparticularly
popular form of compensation for bank CEOs, but as
indicated in the table, the size ofthese awards for 1990 are
a fraction oftotal compensation. Popularpress accounts of
the excessive CEO pay debate suggest the lack of inde-
pendence of the compensation committee is a factor. To
address this, the final section of Table 3 presents the
composition ofthe audit committees for sample banks and
industrial firms.
The data presented in Table 3 are used to determine
whethercross-sectional differences in the level ofcompen-
sation between these two groups can be explained by firm
characteristics. Previous studies of the determinants of
CEO compensation suggest that among the factors impor-
tant in explaining cross-sectional differences are firm size,
CEO tenure, whether the CEO is also chairman of the
board, ownershipby insiders, andfirm performance. These
studies have generally concluded that firm and perform-
ance characteristics have relatively low power to explain
cross-sectional differences in CEO pay. Since it is difficult
(andsomewhatcontroversial) to value non-cashcompensa-
tion the analysis initially will focus on cash compensation
andon ameasure oftotalcompensation. Thecashcompen-
sation measure includes salary plus bonus as reported in
Crystal (1991) and is cross-checked againstthe data for the
sameperiodfrom other sources. The estimates ofthe value
of non-cash compensation are those provided in Crystal
(1991).
The results from regressing CEO cash compensation
(salary + bonus) on firm characteristics are reported in
Table 4. Consistent with previous studies, cash compen-
sation is a positive function of firm size measured by
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TABLE 4
DETERMINANTS OF CROSS-SECTIONAL DIFFERENCES
IN THE LEVEL OF CEO CASH COMPENSATION
REGRESSION
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3)
Constant 4.59 4.58 4.57
(18.78)* (18.44)* (18.44)*
Log (Sales) 0.12 0.14 0.14
(3.71)* (3.77)* (3.92)*
Log (Market Value) 0.15 0.14 0.14
(4.18)* (3.97)* (3.90)*
CEO Years 0.01 0.01 0.01
(1.99)* (2.00)* (1.94)*
Chairman 0.12 0.12 0.12
(1.98)* (1.93)* (1.87)*
Board Ownership 0.01 0.01 0.01
(2.51)* (2.50)* (2.66)*
Bank -0.04 -0.17 -2.94
(0.38) (0.08) (0.84)
Bank X Sales -0.18 -0.15
(0.90) (0.70)
Bank X MV 0.23 0.48
(0.93) (1.51)
Batik: X Chairman 0.01
(0.02)
Bank X Board Ownership -0.04
(1.93)*
R2 .32 .32 .32
F-value 19.41 14.03 11.06
*Indicates the t-value is statistically different from zero at the 0.01
level.
NOTE: Values are corrected for heteroscedasticity using the procedure
by White (1980). Dependent variable: Salary + Bonus.
market value and total sales. Cash compensation is also
higher for those CEOs that also serve as chairman of the
board. CEO pay is a positive function of the number of
years the CEO has beeninthejob,andthe percentageofthe
firm owned by the board. The binary variable indicating
that the CEO is managing a banking firm is negative
though not statistically significant. These results suggest
Economic Review / 1993, Number 1that bank CEOs earn cash compensation similar to that of
nonbank CEOs. To determine whether CEO pay is more or
less sensitive to firm characteristics the binary variable
bank is interacted with sales, market value, and return.
None ofthe interacted variables is statistically significant
at the 0.10 level.
In (3) the binary variable called "Bank" is interacted
with ownership percentage by the board ofdirectors, with
whether the CEO is Chairman, and with the number of
years as a CEO. The coefficient on bank board ownership
percentageis negativeandsignificantindicatingthat salary
and bonus of CEOs decline as ownership by the board
increases. This result is the opposite than thatfor nonbank-
ing firms.
Using the measure of total compensation from Table 3
we are able to examine how the same independent vari-
ables relate to cross-sectional variation in CEO total com-
pensation. The regression results are presented in Table 5.
Consistent with earlier findings for cash compensation,
total compensation is a positive function of firm size as
measuredby sales andmarketvalue ofequity. Totalpay is a
positivefunction ofCEO's tenure inthejobandwhetherhe
also serves as chairmanoftheboard(thoughthecoefficient
on "Chairman" is not statistically significant). The coeffi-
cient on total pay is negative, though not statistically
significant, relative to ownership percentage by the board
of directors. The coefficient on Bank indicates that total
pay for banks is not statisticallydifferent from total pay for
nonbanking firms. The coefficient on the ownership per-
centage by bank boards indicates that as board ownership
increases total compensation decreases (although the sig-
nificance level on this coefficient is at the 0.11 level).
These results suggest that CEOs ofbanks earn levels of
cash and total compensation that are comparable to those
earnedby nonbankCEOs. Themost significantdifferences
between banks andnonbanking firms related to CEO com-
pensation are related to how cross-sectional differences
in levels vary with ownership percentage by the board of
directors. For the sample as a whole, cash compensation is
a positive function of ownership percentage for the board
ofdirectors. The measure oftotal CEO compensation is a
negativefunction ofthe ownershippercentage by the board
of directors. For commercial banks total salary is less
sensitive to ownership percentage by the board and total
CEO compensation is more sensitive (negatively related)
than for the sample as a whole.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper examined the provisions ofthe FDIC Improve-
ment Act related to the corporate governance of banks.
Specifically, the composition ofthe board audit committee
Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco
TABLE 5
DETERMINANTS OF CROSS-SECTIONAL DIFFERENCES
IN THE LEVEL OF CEO TOTAL COMPENSATION
REGRESSION
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3)
Constant 4.55 4.53 4.51
(12.70)* (12.42)* (12.46)*
Log (Sales) 0.13 0.14 0.14
(? 'i7)* (? 'iQ)* (2.62)* ,-...... '/ '-·...,. ..... 1
Log (Market Value) 0.221 0.21 0.21
(4.20)* (4.03)* (4.07)*
CEO Years 0.01 0.01 0.01
(1.73) (1.70) (1.73)
Chairman 0.12 0.11 0.14
(1.27) (1.20) (1.47)
Board Ownership -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(1.32) (1.31) (1.11)
Bank -0.09 1.12 5.12
(0.54) (0.33) (1.00)
Bank X Sales -0.21 0.36
(0.72) (Ll8)
Bank X MV 0.08 -0.16
(0.22) (0.32)
Bank X Chairman -0.30
(0.52)
Bank X Board Ownership -0.05
(1.63)
R2 .27 .26 .27
F-value 15.92 10.65 9.02
*Indicates the (-value is statistically different from zero at the 0.01
level.
NOTE: See Note to Table 4.
for a sampleofbanks was comparedto industrial firms and
to the guidelines under the Act. For1990the22 depository
institutions includedinthe S&P 500 show thatfor the most
part audit committees are composed of outside directors,
and typically one outside directorhas a direct affiliation to
the bank. These are likely to be replaced by more indepen-
dent outside directors as a result of FDICIA. It has been
21indicated that directors with affiliations as outside direc-
tors to customers of the bank are ineligible for the audit
committee. This suggests FDICIA will likely have a large
impactoncompositionofthesecommitteesforlargebanks.
Potential consequences of provisions related to officer
and director compensation are examined by focusing on
the levels of CEO and outside director compensation. A
comparison is made between banking and industrial firms
regarding the level and form of compensation. Cross-
sectionaldifferences in the levels ofCEO compensationare
examined to determine if firm characteristics can explain
cross-sectional variation in CEO compensation for banks
and nonbanking firms. The results indicate factors impor-
tant in explaining CEO compensation for the S&P 500
firms also explain cross-sectional differences in CEO com-
pensation for banking firms. Differences between banking
andnonbanking firms are primarily related to the relation-
ship between equity ownership by the board of directors
and the level of CEO compensation. Both cash and total
compensation for bank CEOs is a negative function of
equityownership by the board ofdirectors. For the sample
as a whole, CEO cash compensation is a positive function
ofownership by the board, while total compensation is a
negative (though statistically insignificant) function of
ownership by the board ofdirectors.
Oneinterpretation ofthe findings ofthis study is thatthe
provisions ofthe FDIC Improvement Act of1991 related to
corporate governance and CEO compensation were unnec-
essary. The basis for this is that audit committees for large
banks, the apparent target of this legislation, are already
composed mainly ofoutside directors. Secondly, the com-
pensation ofbank officers (CEOs) and directors (outside)
appears to be at similar levels and largely determined by
characteristics similartothoseofnonbanking firms. While
it is beyond the scope of this paper to determine whether
the overall level ofCEO pay is excessive, it does conclude
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